Constitutional Transformation and Its Implications for Japanese Pacifist Democracy by McArthur, David
Santa Clara Journal of International Law
Volume 7 | Issue 1 Article 4
1-1-2009
Constitutional Transformation and Its Implications
for Japanese Pacifist Democracy
David McArthur
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.scu.edu/scujil
This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Santa Clara Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Santa Clara Journal of International Law by an authorized administrator of Santa Clara Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
sculawlibrarian@gmail.com.
Recommended Citation
David McArthur, Comment, Constitutional Transformation and Its Implications for Japanese Pacifist Democracy, 7 Santa Clara J. Int'l
L. 197 (2009).
Available at: http://digitalcommons.law.scu.edu/scujil/vol7/iss1/4
Constitutional Transformation and Japanese Democracy
Constitutional
Transformation and Its
Implications for
Japanese Pacifist
Democracy
David McArthur
I. Introduction
One of the characteristic provisions of the modem Constitution of Japan is its
strict "Pacifist Clause" in Article 9, which explicitly rejects the nation's sovereign
right to engage in warfare and prohibits the maintenance of military forces.'
Contrary to the high-minded pacifist restrictions of Article 9 is the existence of the
Japan Self-Defense Forces ("JSDF"), funded by the fifth largest military budget in
the world.2 While the JSDF has been controversial since its inception in 1954, the
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1. Christopher W. Hughes, Why Japan Could Revise Its Constitution and What It Would
Mean for Japanese Security Policy, 50 ORBIS 725, 725 (2006); KENPO [Constitution] art. 9
(Japan).
2. Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, Thefifteen major spender countries in
2006, http://www.sipri.org/contents/milap/milex/mexmajor-spenders.pdf/download (last
visited Jan. 28, 2008).
7 SANTA CLARA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 1 (2009)
recent deployment of JSDF units in roles supporting the United States' military
campaigns overseas has intensified questions from observers in Japan as well as
abroad regarding the constitutionality of Japan's well-equipped and internationally
deployed military forces.
This paper will analyze the legality of Japan's modem military capability and
the appropriateness of the Japanese government's recent attempts to increase the
scope of its military power beyond the pacifist restrictions of Article 9 via the
process of constitutional transformation. My argument is two-fold: (1) that a
policy of constitutional transformation will upset the balance of power within
Japan's government and tarnish Japan's legitimacy as a constitutional democracy;
and (2) the expansion of Japan's military operations outside of its borders
facilitated by a policy of constitutional transformation will further deteriorate
Japan's already tenuous relations with neighboring states.
II. History of Article 9
On August 15, 1945, six days following the atomic bombing of Nagasaki, Japan
surrendered unconditionally to the United States of America and World War II
officially came to an end . The Allied Forces subsequently occupied Japan, and
the entire territory was governed by military administration directed by the
Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers, General Douglas MacArthur. 5 One of
the most important tasks before the American occupiers of Japan following the
overthrow of Japan's wartime military regime was the drafting of a new
constitution to replace the outdated Meiji Constitution. 6  Under General
MacArthur's command, American military lawyers drafted a new, liberal
constitution designed to allow for an effective democratic government to rule post-
3. CHIYUKI AOI, ASSERTING CIVILIAN POWER OR RISKING IRRELEVANCE? JAPAN'S POST-
COLD WAR POLICY CONCERNING THE USE OF FORCE, IN GLOBAL GOVERNANCE:
GERMANY AND JAPAN IN THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM 113 (Saori N. Katada et al. eds.,
2004); Norimitsu Onishi, A Region Inflamed: Japan Commits Itself to Sending Up to 600
Ground Troops to Iraq, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 10, 2003, at A16, available at
http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9EO6E IDE I F3DF933A25751C I A9659C8
B63; Kiroku Hanai, Ways to Steer Public Opinion, THE JAPAN TIMES ONLINE, June 25,
2007, http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/eo20070625kh.html.
4. Instrument of Surrender, U.S.-Japan, Sept. 2, 1945, 3 Bevans 1251; Henry L. Stimson, The
Decision to Use the Atomic Bomb, HARPER'S MAGAZINE, Feb. 1947, at I, available at
http://www.aasianst.org/EAA/StimsonHarpers.pdf.
5. Id. at7.
6. ld. at9.
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war Japan.7 Following some amendments by Japan's bicameral legislature, the
National Diet, the new Constitution of Japan was approved on October 6, 1946.8
Article 9 of the Constitution reads:
Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order, the Japanese
people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of
force as means of settling international disputes.
In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph, land, sea, and air forces, as
well as other war potential, will never be maintained. The right of belligerency of the state
will not be recognized.
9
While other countries have language in their constitutions disavowing war as a
tool of international relations, Japan's constitution alone completely forbids the
maintenance of a military.' 0 While it may seem strange for a sovereign nation to
deny itself the right to maintain a military and thus the ability to effectively defend
its own borders from foreign attack, this strict pacifistic language was included in
Article 9 to be an absolute safeguard to prevent Japan from ever again succumbing
to undemocratic military rule or perpetrating imperialistic aggression against its
neighbors as it had prior to and during World War II.1 The drafters of the new
Constitution of Japan believed that reserving the state's right to maintain a
military, even if explicitly for self-defense alone, would create a legal and practical
loophole in which otherwise ostensibly offensive military action could be
justified. 2 Indeed, Japan had used the right of national self-defense as a
justification for its pre-war imperial military expansion.13
The drafters of Article 9 instead intended for Japan to rely on cooperation with
the international community and its allies to provide for the defense of its territory
in the future.' 4 This concept most importantly manifested in the form of Japan's
security treaty with the United States, which resulted in a network of American
military bases throughout Japanese territory. '
5
7. MERYLL DEAN, JAPANESE LEGAL SYSTEM 465 (2d ed. 2002).
8. Birth of the Constitution of Japan, National Diet Library (2003-2004),
http://www.ndl.go.jp/constitution/e/shiryo/04/131 shoshi.html.
9. KENPO art. 9 (Japan).
10. Hughes, supra note 1, at 727.
11. Kenneth L. Port, Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution and the Rule of Law, 13 CARDOZO
J. INT'L & COMP. L. 127, 142-145 (2005).
12. Id at 143.
13. AOI, supra note 3, at 113.
14. Port, supra note 11, at 144.
15. See Security Treaty Between the United States and Japan, U.S.-Japan, Sept. 8, 1951, 3
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III. Formation of the JSDF
The JSDF has its origins in the National Police Reserve, an internal security
force of 75,000 men initially authorized by General MacArthur to ensure internal
stability in Japan following the transfer of most of the occupying American
military force to the Korean peninsula in 1950 to engage in the Korean War.'
6
Before the Self-Defense Forces Law was enacted, which would allow for the
creation of the JSDF, the Japanese Diet fiercely debated whether the JSDF was
constitutional under Article 9 and whether the JSDF could legally serve overseas. 17
The Diet finally passed the Self-Defense Forces Law with the stipulation that the
JSDF would not be deployed overseas even in furtherance of collective self-
defense required by the Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement Between Japan and
the United States of America. 18 This principle was affirmed by a unanimous
Upper House resolution in 1954 and then by the government's official
interpretation of the Self Defense Forces Law issued in 1956, which stated that the
JSDF would only be used for strict self-defense in case of foreign attack against
Japanese territory and not for collective self defense when Japan was not directly
under attack.' 9
IV. Judicial Challenges Brought Under Article 9
Following the JSDF's creation, the constitutionality of its existence and Japan's
right to self-defense under Article 9 has been challenged in the courts of Japan.
20
The Constitution of Japan explicitly grants the Supreme Court the power of
constitutional judicial review over legislative actions. 2' The first Supreme Court
case to review a challenge brought under Article 9 was Sakata v. Japan (known as
22the Sunakawa case) in 1959. In the Sunakawa case, the appellants were
defendants to criminal charges for trespassing on an American military base in
Sunakawa, a town outside of Tokyo. 23 The appellants argued in their defense that
U.S.T. 3329; GLENN D. HOOK ET AL., JAPAN'S INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS: POLITICS,
ECONOMICS AND SECURITY 33 (2d ed. 2005).
16. Port, supra note II,at 141.
17. Self Defense Forces Law, Law No. 165 of 1954; AOI, supra note 3, at 113.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Port, supra note 11, at 145.
21. KENPO art. 81 (Japan).
22. Sakata v. Japan, 13 KEISHO 3225 (Sup. Ct., Dec. 16, 1959).
23. Id.
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the presence of the American military base on Japanese soil constituted a violation
of Article 9 of the Constitution of Japan. 4 While the trial court agreed with their
argument, the Supreme Court did not and reversed the trial court's decision. 5 The
Supreme Court held that because Japan's national security relationship with the
United States was a highly political issue, it was best left for the legislature and
cabinet to decide.2 6 The Court stated it would only intervene on constitutional
grounds if the legislature acted in an "obviously unconstitutional" manner.
27
The Supreme Court considered the constitutionality of the JSDF under Article 9
when it reviewed Uno et al. v. Minister of Agriculture and Forestry (known as the
Naganuma case) in 1982.28 While the Court had previously affirmed Japan's right
to self-defense under Article 9, the Naganuma case was the first time the
constitutionality of the 1954 Self-Defense Forces Law establishing the JSDF was
before the Supreme Court of Japan. 29 The plaintiffs, residents of Naganuma, a
small town in Hokkaido prefecture, brought their action against the Japanese
government when it attempted to convert a section of national forest preserve into
a Nike missile site. 30 The plaintiffs alleged that the construction violated Article 9,
in addition to contributing to soil erosion and destroying flood control provided by
the forest. 31 While the plaintiffs prevailed before the Sapporo District Court,
which proclaimed the JSDF unconstitutional under Article 9, the Sapporo High
Court reversed on appeal, and the Supreme Court of Japan affirmed the Naganuma
decision.32 The Supreme Court held that, because the JSDF had since taken special
measures to prevent erosion and flooding resulting from the construction, the
plaintiffs were not directly harmed by the actions of the Minister or the JSDF and
thus lacked standing to bring the case on purely constitutional grounds.33 The
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Craig Martin, The Case Against "Revising Interpretations" of the Japanese Constitution,
JAPAN Focus, May 29, 2007, at para. 21, http://japanfocus.org/products/details/2434.
28. Uno et al. v. Minister of Agric. and Forestry, 36 MINSHO 1679 (Sup. Ct., Sept. 9, 1982).
29. See Sakata v. Japan, 13 KEISHO 3225 (holding that Article 9 does not prohibit Japan from
being able to take the measures necessary for self-defense in order to maintain its peace and
security relating to the Japan-United States Security Treaty); Robert L. Seymour, Japan's
Self-Defense: The Naganuma Case and Its Implications, 47 PAC. AFF. 421, 422 (1974).
30. Id. at 426.
31. Id.
32. Port, supra note II, at 146.
33. Martin, supra note 27, at para. 22.
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Supreme Court's ruling on the Naganuma case effectively narrowed the standing
required to bring claims under Article 9 against the government to be all but
impossible.34
V. Constitutional Transformation
As the Supreme Court failed to determine definitively the constitutionality of
the JSDF in the Naganuma case, the JSDF continued to operate undeterred.35 In
1992, the National Diet passed the International Peace Cooperation Law, allowing
the JSDF to operate abroad in United Nations peacekeeping operations under
limited conditions. 36 At the request of the United States, Prime Minister Junichiro
Koizumi deployed the JSDF in a logistical capacity to assist the reconstruction of
Iraq in 2004.3  This represented the first deployment of Japanese troops abroad
without the authority of the United Nations since World War 1I and has proved to
be extremely controversial because of its apparent conflict with Article 9 and prior
understandings of the restrictions placed upon the JSDF.38
Under pressure from the United States government to support its military
campaigns in Afghanistan and Iraq, the politically dominant Liberal Democratic
Party of Japan has pushed in recent years to amend Article 9.39 The proposed
amendment would retain the section denouncing war as a means of resolving
international disputes, but would change the section prohibiting the maintenance of
military forces to allow for a self-defense force that could be deployed abroad in
support of international operations. 4 0 However, the amendment process provided
for by the Constitution of Japan makes it very difficult for a new amendment to be
34. Id.
35. Seymour, supra note 29, at 434.
36. Japan's Contribution to UN Peacekeeping Operations, THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN
AFFAIRS OF JAPAN, at para. 1, http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/un/pko/pamph2005.html (last
visited Jan. 28, 2008).
37. Hanai, supra note 3.
38. Id.
39. Joshua Kurlantzick, Axis of Good The Case for Remilitarizing Japan, WASH. MONTHLY,
July-Aug., 2002, at 4, available at
http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi-m 1316/is_2002_July-August/ai_90114011; Annie
Schleicher, New Japanese Leader Looks to Expand Nation's Military, NEWSHOUR EXTRA,
Sept. 20, 2006, http://www-tc.pbs.org/newshour/extra/features/july-dec06/japan_9-20.pdf.
43 Holly Manges Jones, Japan May Revise Military Clause In Constitution, JURIST, Oct. 6,
2005, http://jurist.law.pitt.edu/paperchase/2005/1 0/japan-may-revise-military-clause-in.php.
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passed.4' Article 96 requires a two-thirds supermajority of each house of the Diet
and a majority from a popular referendum for any change to be made.42 No
amendment to the Japanese Constitution has passed since 1947, when the new
constitution took effect and superseded the previous constitution.43
Because of the inherent difficulty of passing a constitutional amendment, Prime
Minister Shinzo Abe looked for another solution to the apparent contradiction
between Article 9 and the activities of the JSDF abroad. In April of 2007, Abe
announced that the government was planning to establish a panel of experts to
explore the option of revising the current official interpretation of Article 9.44 This
revision, coupled with the Supreme Court of Japan's reluctance to interfere with
the political process and the decisions of the legislature, would create a situation of
defacto constitutional transformation that would allow for the continued operation
of the JSDF in its activities abroad without changing the wording of Article 9.45
While Prime Minister Abe has since resigned following his party's defeat in the
House of Councillors election on July 29th, 2007, it remains to be seen whether his
successor, Yasuo Fukuda, will pursue a policy of constitutional transformation as a
means to resolve the Article 9 question.46
VI. Analysis
A. Constitutional Transformation Will Upset the Balance of Power Within the
Japanese Government
If the Japanese government implements a policy of constitutional
transformation concerning Article 9 it will greatly erode, if not extinguish, the
power of the Supreme Court of Japan to review the actions of the legislative and
executive branches on constitutional grounds. While the Supreme Court rarely
41. AREND LIJPHART, PATTERNS OF DEMOCRACY: GOVERNMENT FORMS AND PERFORMANCE
IN THIRTY-SIX COUNTRIES 222 (1999).
42. KENPO art. 96 (Japan).
43. LIJPHART, supra note 4 1, at 223.
47. Martin, supra note 27, at para. 1.
45. Id. at para. 2.
46. Hiroko Nakata, Abe Announces He Will Resign, THE JAPAN TIMES ONLINE, Sept. 13, 2007,
http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/nn2007O9l2xi.html; Masami [to, Fukuda Elected
Prime Minister in Diet Faceoff THE JAPAN TIMES ONLINE, Sept. 26,
2007,http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/nn20070926a .html.
7 SANTA CLARA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 1 (2009)
exercises the power of judicial review, it has done so in the past.47 If the Japanese
cabinet begins to offer its own interpretations of the Constitution, specifically ones
that plainly contradict the language of Article 9, it will force the Supreme Court to
either contradict these claims and lead to a potential constitutional crisis, or tacitly
accept the supremacy of the legislative and executive arms of the government in
48
matters of constitutional interpretation. In light of the Court's own narrowly
tailored standard for reviewing claims brought under Article 9 established in the
Naganuma case, supra, it is unlikely that the Supreme Court would face the
government directly over this issue. The Supreme Court's strong deference
towards the decisions of the government concerning national security would lead
to a situation where the ruling party in the legislature is free to offer its own
interpretations of the constitution, thus destroying the vital balance-of-power
aspect judicial review brings to a democracy.
B. Constitutional Transformation Will Harm Japan's International Relations
A policy of constitutional transformation concerning Article 9 will significantly
damage Japan's relations with its neighbors, namely China, North Korea and South
Korea. In light of China's growing economic and political influence in the region
and North Korea's recent emergence as a nuclear-armed power, the unsettled
question of Japan's legal ability to project military force across national boundaries
represents another unwelcome destabilizing factor within the international politics
of East Asia. 49
The end of strict Japanese pacifism brought on by de facto constitutional
transformation would have severe repercussions for Japan's relations with its
neighbors. 50  The peoples and political leaders of those countries have not
forgotten Japan's actions of brutal imperialism during World War II, and they
47. See, e.g., Koshiyama v. Chairman, Tokyo Metro. Election Supervision Comm'n, 18
MINSHO 270 (Sup. Ct., Feb. 5, 1964) (ruling that a 5:1 discrepancy in the voter-to-
representative ratio between two districts was an unconstitutional violation of the right to an
equal vote).
48. Martin, supra note 27, at para. 34.
49. Bruce Kennedy, Regional "Godfather" or Local Bully?, CNN INTERACTIVE (2001),
http://www.cnn.com/SPECIALS/ I 999/china.50/asian.superpower/ neighbors/; Larry A.
Niksch, North Korea's Nuclear Program, Congressional Research Service Issue Brief for
Congress 9-10 (2005), http://www.nuclearfiles.org/menu/key-issues/nuclear-
weapons/issues/proliferation/north-korea/46412 .pdf.
50. Martin, supra note 27, at para. 35.
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remain suspicious and antipathetic towards Japan to this day.5' Article 9 is vital to
maintaining normal relations with Japan's neighbors by strongly affirming Japan's
commitment to international peace and cooperation. Once Article 9's viability is
questioned (as it would be if it were to be subjected to constitutional
transformation), the resulting uncertainty has the strong potential to create further
ill-will towards Japan in the region.
IV. Conclusion
While defacto transformation of Article 9 represents a significant threat to the
rule of law in Japan and to Japan's relations with its neighbors, the situation is not
entirely grim. The Liberal Democratic Party is in a tenuous position in Japan after
having lost control of the upper house of the National Diet in the summer of
122007. While the Liberal Democratic Party has used its remaining control of the
lower house to reaffirm the remaining overseas mission of the JSDF, Fukuda has
not expressed any desire recently to aggressively pursue the amendment of Article
9.53 However, with the lack of a clear Supreme Court decision on the issue of
Article 9 and the extent to which it allows for Japan's right to participate in
collective self-defense, it is possible that the threat of constitutional transformation
will appear once more.
Part of the solution must come in the form of support from the United States for
Japan as a pacifist nation, rather than the United States' past policy of pushing
Japan toward constitutional crisis by encouraging Japan's logistical support of
American military campaigns. The United States should emphasize the mutual
defense provided for by the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty to assuage Japanese fears
of North Korean or Chinese hostility.54 Most importantly it is the will of the
Japanese people and their strong support for Article 9 and the concept of
constitutional pacifism that will be the protector of this crucial aspect of modern
Japanese democracy.
55
51. Carin Zissis, Japan's New Leader Faces Old Problems with China and South Korea,
COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, Oct. 16, 2006, http://www.cfr.org/publication/l 1738/.
52. The "Caretaker ", THE ECONOMIST, Jan. 17, 2008, available at
http://www.economist.com/world/asia/displaystory.cfm?story_id = 10534302.
53. Id.
54. See Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between the United States and Japan, U.S.-
Japan, Jan. 19, 1960, 11 U.S.T. 1632.
55. Constitution Survey Shows 77% Oppose Changing Article 9, THE JAPAN TIMES ONLINE,
May 4, 2006, available at http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/nn20060504a6.html.
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